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Abstract: This study has analysed the implications of institutional 
design of macroeconomic policy making institutions for the macro-
economic policy interaction and financial sector in the United King-
dom. Employing a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model and using 
monthly data from January 1985 to August 2008 we found that the 
changes in institutional arrangement and design of policy making 
authorities appeared to be a major contributing factor in dynamics 
of association between policy coordination/combination and finan-
cial sector. It was also found that the independence of the Bank of 
England (BoE) and withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
led to the increase in macroeconomic policy maker’s ability to coor-
dinate and restore financial stability. The results imply that although 
institutional autonomy in the form of instrument independence 
(monetary policy decisions) could bring financial stability, there is 
a strong necessity for coordination, even in Post-MPC (Monetary 
Policy Committee) and the BoE independence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic policies have significant effects which are not limited to the real 
economy and a number of studies, for instance, Bredin et al. (2005), Ardagna 
(2009) and Arnold et al. (2010) reported their significant influence contributing to 
dynamics of financial sector. In comparison with monetary policy, although less 
attention has been paid to investigate the association between fiscal policy and 
the financial sector (Ardagna, 2009; Blanchard et al., 2010) there is sufficiently 
enough evidence to support the notion of financial stability being also influenced 
by fiscal stance (see Blanchard et al. 2010; Zigman and Cota, 2011; Benigno et al; 
2013). Nevertheless, beside the individual analysis of macroeconomic policies, 
there is an emerging consensus in recent literature which suggests considering 
interaction of macroeconomic policies rather than implication of a single policy 
stance for financial sector (see Jansen et al., 2008; Nasir and Soliman, 2014) which 
is also the theme of this study. 
An important aspect of macroeconomic policies is the structure and design of their 
parental institutions. The organization structure involves the formal division of 
organization in subunits, location of decision making responsibilities within that 
structure and establishment of integrating mechanism to coordinate the activities 
of subunit of origination (Hill, 2014). Institutional design is an important aspect 
to be kept under consideration while studying the subject of macroeconomic poli-
cies as any change in the framework of policy making institutions could affect the 
effectiveness of policies they formulate (see Lu and In, 2006; Osborn and Sensier, 
2009). Specific to the policy framework in the UK, we can acknowledge some major 
changes in the past few decades, for instance the membership and departure from 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which was a fixed exchange rate system (with 
margin of fluctuations) in 1992 or independence of the Bank of England (BoE) in 
1997 that resulted in a major shift in institutional design and major changes in 
the Bank’s traditional responsibilities. Certain responsibilities related to financial 
stability e.g. banking sector supervision and management of sovereign debt, were 
all transferred to the Financial Service Authority (FSA) and the Debt Management 
Office (DMO). In this regard, studies like on New Zealand by Lu and In (2006) 
and on Britain Osborn and Sensier (2009) indicated variability in the effective-
ness of monetary policy after any institutional framework changes. Although there 
are also some voices declaring these institutional changes for instance the Bank of 
England’s independence in 1997 as overrated institutional changes for price stabil-
ity (see Mariscal and Howells, 2007). Concomitantly refereeing back to the debate 
on the influence of macroeconomic policy interaction on financial sector, in the 
context of the UK, it is imperative to analyse the dynamics of macroeconomic pol-
icy interactions and coordination in the light of said institutional changes. 
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This study analyses the implications of structural changes in the design of pol-
icy making institutions on the association between policy interaction and the 
financial sector. Specifically, we focused on stock and bond market, the choice of 
these two markets as proxy for financial sector because of their Wealth Effects on 
the real economy (see Malikane and Semmler, 2008; Funke et al., 2011; Airaudo, 
2015). Nevertheless, the context in which we are analysing the interaction of mac-
roeconomic policies is the financial stability. In this regard, we also refer to Kon-
tonikas et al. (2006) who argue that optimal1 monetary policy should positively 
affect stock market and house prices due to Wealth Effects of these assets. Hence 
it is not either the stock or bond market we need to positively influence per se, these 
are their Wealth Effects which justify a macroeconomic policy role. The difference 
this study is making is by taking it further by taking fiscal policy, bond market 
and institutional design changes on board. Putting it rather simple, the main aim 
of this research is to evaluate how the institutional designs influence the associa-
tion between policy interaction and financial stability. This could be achieved by 
investigating implications of changes in the institutional design in Britain for 
policy interaction and financial sector. There are several reasons for the choice of 
UK financial sector (a) size and significance of subject financial sector for British 
economy as well as international financial system (b) availability of reliable data 
from credible sources (c) well established policy making intuitions which have 
been leaders in reforms2. 
A particular feature of the subject study makes it very pragmatic, as we will be 
able to see how institutional design defines the ability of policies and the context 
in which they are formulated. In the context of recent developments to restore fi-
nancial stability, it is important to mention here that the BoE has recently formu-
lated Financial Policy Committee (FPC)3. As cited earlier, it is the major change 
in functioning of the BoE since May 1997. Since then the official mandate of the 
1 Our definition of optimal policy combination for financial stability is to some degree unique 
as mostly optimal policy has been seen as a single policy in context of real economy. To pro-
vide some support from existing evidence, we refer to Kontonikas et al. (2006) and Khorasgani 
(2010) which declared a monetary policy as optimal which positively affects Stock and Forex 
markets. 
2 The Britain is leading the world and The Bank of England has been the main source of fresh 
thinking, see an interesting account by John Kay (2003). Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/40231e4a-dcdc-11e2-b52b-00144feab7de.html#axzz3EDkmBJGK, (accessed 6.6.14). 
3 Headed by Governor of the Bank of England this committee would monitor UK financial sec-
tor and its effects on economy. Available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
news/2011/041.htm, (accessed 2.5.14). Moreover, there has been a formulation of the FCA (Fi-
nancial Conduct Authority), and the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority). The focus of all of 
them is on financial stability, both micro-prudential and macro-prudential. 
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BoE was price stability by targeting inflation at 2% Consumer Price Index (CPI)4. 
However in the context of these changes it could be well anticipated that in the 
future, influence on financial sector would also be considered in macroeconomic 
policy formulation; yet, existing literature does not provide any evidence of it. 
Neither has it provided great details on the aspect of previous changes nor their 
implications for under analysis factors of policy interaction and financial sector. 
Recent studies also consider it preferable to use both macroeconomics policies si-
multaneously while analysing their impact on real economy (Porqueras and Alva, 
2010; Sims, 2011). Therefore in this study we would take both fiscal and monetary 
policies on board. Despite the acknowledged importance of joint policy analysis, 
most of the studies in the existing literature have been only focused on single 
policy. Even the limited number of studies which investigated the effects of policy 
interaction or combination have only considered real economy; financial sector 
could not gain adequate attention (Jansen et al., 2008; Nasir and Soliman, 2014). 
As we have acknowledged in previous paragraphs that the impact of monetary 
policy is contingent on institutional design. It implies that there is a prospect that 
the aspect of policy coordination and combination of macroeconomic policies 
may also be influenced by changes in the institutional design and hence their im-
plications for the financial sector. However, in existing body of literature on the 
subject, we could not evident a study which has analysed impact of these factors 
on macroeconomic policy interaction, neither for financial sector. It would help 
to understand the implication for optimal policy mix in the light of institutional 
changes. 
2. DEBATE ON INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The importance of institutional design and arrangement in the light of various 
studies has also been briefly acknowledged in the previous section, however we 
would revisit and debate a few more evidences to establish its relevance with sub-
ject study. The addition of institutional arrangement aspects is motivated by the 
arguments by Srinivasan et al. (2009) that the institutions must be designed so 
that the central bank’s commitment to its objectives is not in doubt. In this con-
text, the financial stability has not been a prime objective of any central bank, 
at least not explicitly, to best of our knowledge, however if institutional design 
4 Since October 2003, CPI (Consumer Price Index) also named as HICP (Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices) is targeted at 2% with 1% tolerance range. 
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affects the outcome of macroeconomic policy, it raises question about its implica-
tions for financial sector. 
One of the major institutional arrangements made during the time of study was 
independence of the BoE. This may sound a simple case of giving autonomy to 
monetary authority to achieve its prime objective for price stability; perhaps it 
was the explicit good intention. Nevertheless, it was rather more complex and 
vital change in functioning of the BoE. Specifically, subject decision resulted in a 
big shift in institutional design and certain responsibilities related with financial 
stability e.g. banking sector supervision and management of sovereign debt were 
transferred to FSA and DMO (i.e. the supervision of banking sector was trans-
ferred to FSA and the responsibility of Sovereign debt stabilization was trans-
ferred to DMO). These are the major shifts in responsibilities and authorities 
with an intention to increase the efficiency of policy formulation; however these 
changes may have important implication for financial sector. Perhaps the recent 
or post financial crises development and revival of the BoE role in financial sta-
bility is something that requires plentiful attention. The Financial Services Act 
(2012) lead to major reform in the form of formulation of FPC. The prime objec-
tive of the Committee is to identify, monitor and take action to reduce systemic 
risk for the protection and resilience of the British financial sector, in addition, 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), as a part of the BoE, also started 
functioning from April 2013 with the objection of banking sector supervision. 
Specific to effectiveness of macroeconomic policies and financial stability these 
institutional changes raised a question whether the withdrawal of earlier cited 
responsibilities of financial supervision from the BoE influenced macroeconomic 
policy role. 
In this context a study by Weymark (2007) declared that a fully independent 
central bank is only concerned with the achievement of economic objectives, 
whereas fiscal authority may influence monetary framework. However, we need 
to validate these assertions and extend them to financial sector. We can report 
some evidence on this aspect in a US case, Lobo (2000) concluded that the Fed-
eral Reserve policy of immediate disclosure has resulted in change of volatil-
ity of stock market from before to after the announcement of monetary policy 
decisions. Later investigation by Lobo et al. (2006) also acknowledged that the 
Federal Reserve disclosure policy has influenced the impact of monetary policy 
on foreign exchange markets. However, we need to see it in the context of Opti-
mal Policy Combination as well as both financial markets (stock and bond). In 
specific to our case the BoE has been independent since 1997 which may have im-
portant implications for macroeconomic policy interaction and financial sector. 
With regard to the macroeconomic policy interaction and real economy, we can 
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associate the study by Dixit and Lambertini (2001) as they argued that in the case 
of disagreement the outcome can be influenced by institution design. 
Despite the fact that we could not evidence many studies on policy coordination 
in the light of institutional design, yet there is some remarkable work done by 
Arby and Hanif (2010) in context of Pakistani experience. They found that the 
monetary policy stance has shown a poor coordination with fiscal policy in Pa-
kistan and the institutional arrangements to increase coordination i.e. establish-
ment of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Coordination Board could not contribute 
towards coordination. This finding would be interesting in the context of UK 
as the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the BoE which is responsible for 
the formulation of monetary policy has a representative of fiscal authority (HM 
Treasury) in its meetings, our empirical findings in this study would give us fur-
ther insight if this arrangement has been successful for policy coordination.
In addition to the independence of the BoE a major change in institutional frame-
work of the BoE was an explicit target of price stability by keeping inflation to 2% 
of CPI or Target 2.0. In this aspect, Haldane and Read (2000) investigated the 
role of monetary policy under the influence of inflation targeting and its effects 
on bond market (yield curve) and found that introduction of inflation targeting 
in the UK has significantly decreased the effects of monetary policy surprises 
on yield curve. They associated it with the increased transparency of monetary 
policy due to inflation targeting. Yet, we are seeing this shift in association with 
addition of interaction with fiscal policy stock market. 
If we review the literature on the performance of policy framework, Institutional 
design of monetary policy in the UK was praised by Bhundia and O’Donnell 
(2002) who argued that the independence of the central bank and institutional 
arrangements are based on the principles of credibility, flexibility and demo-
cratic legitimacy, therefore the independence of the BoE has not only increased 
the effectiveness of monetary policy but also increased the fiscal coordination. 
Bhundia and O’Donnell arguments may be logical but there was no empirical 
evidence. In addition, this assertion also requires validity for financial sector and 
most importantly its combination with fiscal policy. Nevertheless, there is not a 
consensus on the success of institutional design of monetary policy in Britain as 
Mariscal and Howells (2007) rejected the argument of increased transparency 
of monetary policy in the post autonomous BoE era. They argued that although 
switching to inflation targeting itself significantly reduced monetary policy sur-
prises, the subsequent reforms have contributed little. Capitalizing on this debate 
we are taking this battle to the financial sector to see if and how these institution-
al changes have influenced the aspect of policy coordination and concomitantly 
its application for the financial sector. 
Authenticated | m.a.nasir@leedsbeckett.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 9/24/17 1:58 PM
Institutional Design, Macroeconomic Policy Coordination and Implications for the Financial Sector in the UK 101
By analysing institutional changes Osborn and Sensier (2009) found that there 
was a strong evidence that structural break coincides with the introduction of 
inflation targeting. They declared that the inflation targeting is a more impor-
tant change than the independence of BoE. Similarly, Lildholdt and Wetherilt 
(2004) concluded that the ability of market participants to predict monetary 
policy stance by the BoE has been improved. Later, analysing economic and 
structural changes in the UK economy (output, inflation, Forex) under different 
monetary regimes Baumeister and Mumtaz (2010) found that there had been a 
shift in response of monetary policy from economic growth and exchange rates 
fluctuation to inflation. They also acknowledged that economic fluctuation was 
less frequent after 1992 until recent past, though they did not associated it with 
any institutional aspect. The subject study would see their assertions in the light 
of comprehensive and alternative empirical frameworks and its implications in 
financial sector. 
Considering the impact of institutional design on the association among under-
lying variable, we refer to Chow (1960) who argued that the association between 
variables in two different subperiods should be the same if the relationship has 
not been changed during an event. Putting it simple and being specific to our 
case, a shift in the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy and financial 
sector post structural changes in the institutional design would attribute to such 
a change.
3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We would analyse the association between under consideration aspects of finan-
cial sector and macroeconomic policy interaction by using a Vector Autoregres-
sive model to accomplish our research objectives. The statistical inference would 
lead to creation and testing of hypothesis and acquirement of empirical findings. 
It is worthwhile mentioning here that the VAR model would be estimated us-
ing Frequentist or traditional econometric approach i.e. Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) method. 
The time horizon of study is from January 1985 to August 2008 (N = 284) hence 
it includes the major institutional changes (withdrawal from ERM and independ-
ence of the BoE) in the macroeconomic policy formwork of the United Kingdom. 
All observations are in monthly frequency considering the fact that high fre-
quency data would give better estimates (Hautsch, 2011). The BoE’s Bank Rates 
are used as proxy for monetary policy while the fiscal policy is proxied by Public 
Sector Net Cash Requirements formally known as Public Sector Borrowing Re-
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quirements (PSBR) as a percentage of GDP. It represents the fiscal deficit and is 
used as the monthly proxy for fiscal policy representing the fiscal stance. The 
monthly averages of real Yield on UK Government bonds (Gilts) are used as a 
proxy for bond market’s response. The stock market is proxied by monthly aver-
age prices of FTSE-100 index. Stock market data is dividend adjusted so it in-
corporates the earning effects. All data are collected from the Office of National 
Statistics, FTSE Group and BoE database. A Vector Auto Regression framework 
is used for the analysis of structural breaks and their implication. The model is 
presented as below: 
lnBondt = α + βi lnBondt-i + βi Fiscalt-i + βi lnMonetaryt-i + βi lnStockt-i + εt (1)
lnStockt = α+ βi lnStockt-i + βi Fiscalt-i + βi lnMonetaryt-i + βi lnBondt-i + εt (2)
    εt ˜ N(0, σ2)
[Note: Optimal lag selection is on the basis of lag selection criteria, preliminary lags (t-i) 
in above model are for presentation.] 
Chow test is used to find out if there is a structural break coinciding with the 
breakdown of the ERM or the independence of BoE. According to Chow (1960), 
if we split the sample into before and after period of focus, according to the Null 
hypothesis the coefficient of regression analysis in both sub periods should be 
equal to coefficients of total period. For instance, if we split Equation (1) into 
lnBond1t = α1 + βi lnBond1t-i + βi Fiscal1t-i + βi lnMonetary1t-i + βi lnStock1t-i + εt  &
lnBond2t = α2 + βi lnBond2t-i + βi Fiscal2t-i + βi lnMonetary2t-i + βi lnStock2t-i + εt 
In the absence of a structural break, α1 = α2, βi lnBond1t-i= βi lnBond2t-i , βi Fiscal1t-i= 
βi Fiscal2t-i , βi lnMonetary1t-i = βi lnMonetary2t-i and βi lnStock1t-i = βi lnStock2t-i .
Same holds for Equation (2). Thereafter we would perform the Unit Root test us-
ing Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) method. In order to select appropriate 
number of lags, we performed an optimal lag selection test using various crite-
ria (LR: sequential modified LR test statistic, FPE: Final prediction error, AIC: 
Akaike information criterion, SIC: Schwarz information criterion, HQ: Hannan-
Quinn information criterion). After deciding on the number of lags to be includ-
ed in the model as the next step we moved toward the co-integration analysis to 
find whether the variables are co-integrated, i.e. if they have long-run association 
with ether other. In case of a co-integration or long-run association among vari-
ables, we use a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model which is a restricted form 
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of Vector Auto-regression model. The basic feature of VEC model is that it in-
cludes an error correction term (Ut-1) which is a one-period lagged residual term 
and guides or restores the system to equilibrium. The Johansen Co-integration 
method then is used. 
The estimation results often show that various values of lagged explanatory vari-
ables have different sign and size of impact on response variables. Therefore, we 
will perform the Wald test to see the joint impact of response variable in the com-
ing section. We will also see it further in the Diagnostic test which includes Het-
eroskedasticity, Autocorrelation and Exogeneity tests. Nevertheless, to get some 
further insight and to view a big picture of association among variables we will 
perform an Impulse Response Function (IRF) Analysis. 
4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSES 
We started with the analysis of the implications of institutional design and ar-
rangements for macroeconomic policy interaction in the financial sector in the 
UK. The first major episode was the membership and departure from ERM which 
was a fixed exchange rate system (with margin of fluctuations) of its European 
member countries.
4.1 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) & Inflation Targeting 
The first major episode was the membership and departure from ERM which 
was a fixed exchange rate system (with margin of fluctuations) of its European 
members. The decision to join was not very constructive for the UK economy 
and financial sector and led to enormous pressure on its currency and ended 
up in the departure after massive foreign exchange fluctuation in one day called 
“Black Wednesday”. However, due to limited scope of this study we would nei-
ther go into the history of the ERM, nor its impact on the financial sector, rather 
we would see whether the dynamics of relationship among our under analysis 
variables i.e. macroeconomic policy interaction in the financial sector has been 
changed due to ERM experience. 
Interestingly along with the breakup from ERM, a new framework of monetary 
policy was introduced where Retail Price Index (RPI) was used as measure of 
inflation targeting with in a rage of 1 – 4%. To achieve the objective of price 
stability, the interest rates (a tool of monetary policy) were used and used to be 
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set by HM Treasury. In the context of monetary policy framework it was a major 
change as an explicit target (inflation) and tool (interests) were set up. 
At this stage we have limited the time horizon of study from January 1985 to 
April 1997 (N = 148) just before the occurrence of second episode of major insti-
tutional changes (independence of BoE) in macroeconomic policy framework of 
the UK. All the data series were transformed by taking natural log expect fiscal 
policy (deficit/GDP) as it is a ratio which does not require transformation. In ad-
dition, it has negative values which cannot be logged. The notion of transforma-
tion is supported by Nevill and Holder (1995) with the reason that it overcomes 
the issue of Non-normality and Heteroskedasticity and could lead to obtaining 
best estimates from the model. We moved straight to our most important Chow 
test to find out if there is a structural break coincides with the breakdown of the 
ERM. The results are presented as below:
Table 1: Chow Break Point Test-1992M09
 Model Sample: 1986M01 1997M04  
Bond Markets     P – Values 
F-statistic 1.665 Prob. F(49,38) 0.053
Log likelihood ratio 155.894 Prob. Chi-Square(49) 0.000*
Wald Statistic 81.565 Prob. Chi-Square(49) 0.002
Stock Markets    
F-statistic 0.606 Prob. F(49,38) 0.950
Log likelihood ratio 78.564 Prob. Chi-Square(49) 0.005*
Wald Statistic 29.712 Prob. Chi-Square(49) 0.987
*1% level of Significance. 
As we can witness in Table 1, the null of No structural break was rejected at the 
highest level of significance (1%). It implied that the association between macro-
economic policy interaction and financial sector has been significantly changed 
after this structural break. To further investigate the impact of these institutional 
changes for macroeconomic policy interaction, we followed the method pre-
scribed by Politis et al. (1999) and Wong et al. (2006) and divided the analysis 
into pre and post ERM periods. The rationale of doing so is that it will enable us 
to make a comparison between the pre and post ERM scenarios and its implica-
tions for macroeconomic policy interaction. 
Before the estimation of the model it was necessary to test the stationary of the 
data series for the whole period of analysis, hence we performed the Unit Root 
test using a frequently used Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) method which 
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gave us sufficient evidence of stationarity in the data5, however, we also acknowl-
edged a structural break in earlier mentioned Chow test which may pose a ques-
tion on the robustness of our findings in the ADF test. On this aspect, Perron 
(1989) cautioned that ADF test could give biased results. On theoretical grounds, 
a very important point we must elaborate here is that financial assets for example 
stock or bond prices data series exhibit a structural change from their usual trend 
due to various reasons for instance macroeconomic policy decisions or financial 
and economic events. Making this point as a base, some studies like Rangana-
than and Ananthakumar (2010) criticised that ADF test is biased towards null of 
random walk in presence of such a structural break in a series. The reason was 
given that in case of not accounting for structural break, the random shocks are 
assumed to have a permanent effect on the system. However, one special feature 
of this paper is that we are considering the structural breaks; hence it would help 
us test whether these shocks are just transitory around a stable trend path. 
To overcome this potential flaw in ADF test and its theoretical and practical im-
plications, we used Ng-Perron (2001) test of stationarity which propose the fol-
lowing tests: MZa and MZt that are the modified versions of Phillips’ (1987) and 
Phillips and Perron’s (1988) Za and Zt tests; the MSB that is related to Bhargava’s 
(1986) R1 test; and finally, the MPT test that is a modified version of Elliot, Roth-
enberg and Stock’s (1996) Point Optimal Test. We also used Modified Akaike 
Information Criteria (MAIC) and GLS de-trended data for lag length selection 
and construction of unit root test. The results are presented in Table 2:
5 We also performed the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) test and the results indicated that 
in all cases, our test statistics taking the first difference were greater than the benchmark criti-
cal values at 5% as well as 1% level (p- value < 0.01), which implied that all the data series were 
non-stationary at level I (0) yet stationary at 1st difference I (1).The null hypothesis of unit root 
existence could not be rejected at level I(o) but rejected at first differences I(1). It is often the case 
with economic and financial data and quite satisfactory level of stationarity. Nevertheless, the 
residuals were stationary even at the level which is also an indication towards the reliability of 
data.
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Table 2 : Ng – Perron Modified Unit Root Test
Variable MZa MZt MSB MPT
At level I(o)     
LnBond* -11.899 - 2.198 0.184 8.933
LnStock* - 4.544 -1..373 0.302 19.101
Fiscal* - 0.975 - 0.650 0.666 82.971
LnMonetary - 10.783 -2.252 0.208 8.802
Asymptotic Critical Values 5%** - 17.300 - 2.910 0.168 5.480
Asymptotic critical Values 10%*** -14.200 - 2.620 0.185 6.670
1st Difference I(1)     
LnBond* 6.199 3.904 0.629 157.780
LnStock* -4.004 -1.392 0.347 22.491
Fiscal* 1.644 8.585 5.220 6276.00
LN Monetary* -60.520 -5.500 0.090 1.506
Asymptotic Critical Values 5%** -17.300 -2.910 0.168 5.480
Asymptotic Critical Values 10% *** -14.200 -2.620 0.185 6.670
* Ng-Perron test statistics of LnBond, LnStock, Fiscal and LnMonetary. ** Critical value at 5% 
level of significance. *** Critical value at 10% level of significance. 
As shown above the results of Ng-Perron (NP) test indicates that in all cases, our 
test statistics taking the first difference were greater than the benchmark critical 
values at 5% or at least 10% level, which implied that all the data series were sta-
tionary. The null hypothesis of unit root existence was rejected at first differences 
I (1). It is often the case with economic and financial data and quite satisfactory 
level of stationarity. 
Thereafter, we performed an optimal lag selection test using various criteria6. It 
indicated that SC, HQ, FPE criteria indicated one as optimal lag while the AIC 
and LR indicated 12 as optimal lag order. We followed the advice by AIC test. 
The rational for this choice is supported by Liew (2004) when they compared 
several lag selection criteria, they found it most appropriate. However, in par-
ticular to our study the alternative suggestion of one lag was not given best es-
timates, hence for robustness of our analysis we considered and incorporated 
12 lags into our analysis. As the next step we move toward the co-integration 
analysis to find whether the variables are co-integrated i.e. if they have long-run 
association among them. In the case that a co-integration or long-run associa-
6 Sequential modified LR test statistic. FPE: Final prediction error. AIC: Akaike information cri-
terion. SIC: Schwarz information criterion. HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion.
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tion among variables is found, we use a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
which is a restricted form of Vector Auto-regression model. The basic feature of 
VECM model is that it includes an error correction term (Ut-1) which is a one-
period lagged residual term and guides or restores the system to equilibrium. The 
Johansen Co-integration method was used and results of our co-integration test 
are presented below in Table 3. Our results of Johansen Co-integration test which 
included the assumption of linear deterministic trend suggested that there was a 
co-integrating relationship considering 12=lag periods. 
Table 3: Johansen Co-integration Test
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s) Eigen value
Trace
Statistic
0.05
Critical Value Prob.** 
None* 0.503 92.748 47.856 0.000
At most 1* 0.327 38.193 29.797 0.004
At most 2 0.087 7.291 15.495 0.544
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Maximum Eigen value)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s) Eigen value 
Max-Eigen
Statistic
0.05
Critical Value Prob.** 
None* 0.503 54.555 27.584 0.000
At most 1* 0.327 30.902 21.132 0.002
At most 2 0.087 7.096 14.265 0.478
* Hypothesis of no co-integration was rejected by Trace & Max Eigen value test. 
** MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
Both of our Unrestricted Co-integration Rank tests (Trace & Max Eigen statis-
tics) showed that the null of no co-integration was rejected at 5% level on the ba-
sis of MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values, there were two co-integrating 
equations found. It implied that long-term association exists among variables 
and there are at least more than two time series which are co-integrated or share 
the common stochastic drift. Hence we employed a restricted or Vector Error 
Correction Model by incorporating error corrections terms. The estimation re-
sults of the model (Equations 1 & 2) for the Pre and Post-ERM periods by using 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method are obtained7.It showed that for the model 
specified in Equations (1 & 2) there are several values of coefficients ranging from 
positive to negative and significant to insignificant. The P-values < 0.05 indicated 
significant impact of explanatory variables at 95% level of confidence and vice 
versa. Interestingly the Error Correction terms are significant and negative val-
7 To conserve the space the results are not presented here and are available on request. 
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ues on the whole. It is an indication towards the stability of our model. However, 
we would perform the Wald test to see the joint impact of response variable in 
next section; it will also be further elaborated in the Diagnostic test. Hence, to 
test the validity of results and to check the robustness of our model against is-
sues of Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation and Exogenity, a test diagnostic is 
performed, as presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Diagnostic Test (Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation & Exogeneity) 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) Jan 1985 - July 1992
Bond Market
Heteroskedasticity : White Test Test Stat   P value
Obs. R-Squared 46.572 Prob. Chi-Square(50) 0.612
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test
Obs. R-squared 21.656 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.000
Block Exogenity Wald test
Fiscal 38.326 df-12 0.000*
Monetary 14.383 df-12 0.277
All 77.945 df-36 0.001*
Stock Market
Heteroskedasticity : White Test Test Stat P value
Obs. R-Squared 53.330 Prob. Chi-Square(50) 0.347
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test
Obs. R-squared 5.312 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.070
Block Exogenity Wald test
Fiscal 6.621 df-12 0.881
Monetary 8.998 df-12 0.703
All 27.691 df-36 0.838
*Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level 
In our Pre-ERM collapse period the results of diagnostic test showed that for 
stock market the null hypothesis of No Serial Co-relation (Breusch Godfrey test) 
and null hypothesis of Homoskedasticity (White test) could not be rejected at 
benchmarked level of statistical significance (5%). Although the bond market re-
sults could not lead to the acceptance of Null hypothesis of No Serial Co-relation 
(Breusch Godfrey test) at statistical level of significance (5%), null hypothesis of 
Homoskedasticity (White test) was accepted. It implied that we can trust our 
results of model estimation without the fear of Heteroskedasticity and Autocor-
relation. The Block Exogeneity test also showed that fiscal policy has significant 
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exogenous impact on bond market while monetary policy could not reflect the 
same degree of association; however, for macroeconomic policy combination the 
results were significant. Interestingly, for stock market neither individual nor 
combination of macroeconomic policies showed much significant exogenous as-
sociation. We would look into this factor in details in the Wald coefficient restric-
tion test in the coming section. A diagnostic test for the Post-ERM estimation of 
the VAR model was also performed and results are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Diagnostic Test (Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation & Exogeneity) 
Post Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) October 1992 - April 1997
 Bond Market
Heteroskedasticity : White Test Test Stat   P value
Obs. R-Squared 39.252  Prob. Chi-Square(35) 0.2850
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test    
Obs. R-squared 2.092  Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.351
Block Exogenity Wald test    
Fiscal 6.616 df-8 0.578
Monetary 14.672 df-8 0.507
All 18.322 df-24 0.787
 Stock Market
Heteroskedasticity : White Test Test Stat  P value
Obs. R-Squared 35.075  Prob. Chi-Square(35) 0.465
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test    
Obs. R-squared 9.521  Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.009*
Block Exogenity Wald test    
Fiscal 32.158 df-8 0.000*
Monetary 19.425 df-8 0.012*
All 53.065 df-24 0.001*
*Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level 
The results of diagnostic test for Post-ERM period showed that for bond mar-
ket the null hypothesis of the No Serial Co-relation (Breusch Godfrey test) and 
null hypothesis of Homoskedasticity (White test) could not be rejected at bench-
marked level of statistical significance (5%). Although the macroeconomic poli-
cies did not show significant exogenous impact on bond market neither their 
combination, we would shed further light on this aspect in the Wald test for this 
period. On the other hand, diagnostic test for the model analysing the association 
between macroeconomic policies and stock showed that although null of Homo-
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skedasticity (White test) could not be rejected yet we could not accept the null 
of No serial correlation. It is quite initiative and could be expected where stock 
return market behaviour is influenced by previous period scenario and most im-
portantly we can still obtain unbiased and consistent estimates though not much 
efficient. Interestingly each macroeconomic policy as well as their combination 
showed highly significant exogenous impact on stock market. 
A Wald coefficient restriction test was performed to check the significance of 
various parameters of policy variables individually as well as jointly. The results 
of comparative analysis are presented in Table 6: 
Table 6: Wald Test Vector Auto regression Model Jan 1985 – April 1997
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) Jan 1985 - July 1992
Test Statistic Bond Market Chi Test Value df  (P-value)
LnBond 38.442 12 0.034**
Fiscal Policy 38.326 12 0.001*
Monetary Policy 14.383 12 0.276
Fiscal + Monetary (coordination) 48.230 24 0.002*
Test Statistic Stock Market Value df (P-value)
LnStock 4.445 12 0.974
Fiscal Policy 6.621 12 0.882
Monetary Policy 8.998 12 0.703
Fiscal + Monetary (coordination) 19.224 24 0.740
Post Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) October 1992 - April 1997  
Test Statistic Bond Market Value df  (P-value)
LnBond 6.173 8 0.627
Fiscal Policy 6.616 8 0.579
Monetary Policy 7.273 8 0.507
Fiscal + Monetary (coordination) 13.426 16 0.641
Test Statistic Stock Market Value df (P-value)
LnStock 24.721 8 0.002*
Fiscal Policy 32.158 8 0.000*
Monetary Policy 19.425 8 0.012*
Fiscal + Monetary (coordination) 46.996 16 0.000*
*Significance level (1%), **Significance level (5%) & ***Significance level (10%) 
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In addition to the structural break found in Chow test, the results presented in 
Table 6 also indicate a shift in effectiveness of macroeconomics policies in the 
post ERM period. It is prominent that the fiscal policy had significant impact 
on bond market before the breakdown of the ERM. The monetary policy did not 
show a sign of major influence on bond market, although the joint impact of both 
policies was highly significant, even at 1% level. On the other hand, none of single 
macroeconomic policy (or their combination) showed any significant impact on 
stock market in first periods. Very interestingly the second sub-periods showed 
major shift in the effectiveness of policies as their impact on bond market be-
came insignificant which implied that the bond markets became rather efficient 
and stable in the post ERM period. The second major shift in policy dynamics 
was that the impact of both policies individually as well as jointly became highly 
significant on stock market. It is a vital finding implying that before withdrawal 
from the ERM, macroeconomic policies were not able to manoeuvre and influ-
ence stock market. The withdrawal of membership form the ERM seems a good 
decision in the context of macroeconomic policies and their role in financial mar-
kets. Furthermore, it brought stability in bond market. Nevertheless, to get some 
further insight and to view a big picture of the Pre and Post ERM periods, we 
performed an Impulse Response Function (IRF) Analysis for both sub-periods. 
It is worth mentioning here that the Impulses created based on VEC Model do 
not have (95%) confidence interval bands due to the presence of error correction 
terms in the model. However, to overcome this issue we performed bootstrapping 
by employing Efron Percentile Confidence Interval. One hundred bootstrap rep-
lications were carried out (B = 100) using JMulti-4 software package. The results 
are presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: VECM Impulse Response Function (IRF): Period Jan 1985 - July 1992
Source: Author’s Calculations using JMulti-4. 
The results of the IRF analysis presented above showed that in the Pre-ERM col-
lapse, contractionary monetary policy has positive impact on stock markets. 
Same policy stance by monetary authority led to a positive response from bond 
market. However in the long term it remained negative. On the other hand, con-
tractionary fiscal policy negatively affected stock and bond markets. It terms that 
policy interaction contractionary fiscal policy led to a mild expansionary stance 
from monetary authority. Whereas the monetary contraction led to fiscal expan-
sion, hence in this scenario an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy stance 
seems an optimal policy combination. Particularly for bond market as in the case 
of stock market the fiscal policy was rather more effective. It also supports the 
notion of using fiscal policy when monetary policy is not very effective.
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Figure 2: VECM Impulse Response Function (IRF): Period Jan 1985 - July 1992
Source: Author’s Calculations using JMulti-4.*Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E
In the Post-ERM scenario, the impact of macroeconomic policies on financial 
sector shifted. The contractionary monetary policy led to mild positive response 
from stock and bond markets whereas the similar policy stance from fiscal au-
thority also resulted in positive response from bond market. The contraction-
ary monetary stance led to fiscal consolidation and vice versa. The comparative 
analysis of two periods in above figure showed that the response of both stock 
and bond markets was milder in the second period (Post ERM). These finding are 
related to a study on state dependency (recession or boom) by Basistha and Kurov 
(2008) and Kurov (2010) and Chen (2012) as they argued that the monetary poli-
cy is more effective in recession and bearish stock markets than boom and bullish 
stock markets. Howeve,r we have taken their argument further by addition of fis-
cal policy and bond markets. Hence, in addition to the previous findings in Table 
6 that bond and stock markets responses to policy shock variously with respect to 
financial turmoil. We may disagree with the arguments by Park (2008) made in 
study on macroeconomic policy and exchange rates that often the exchange rate 
policy was not affected by monetary and fiscal policies. 
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Period October 1992 - April 1997 
Figure 3: VECM Impulse Response Function (IRF): Period October 1992 - April 1997 
Source: Author’s Calculations using JMulti-4.*Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
As we can witness that the withdrawal from the ERM significantly changes the 
association of macroeconomic policies and financial sector. Looking at the same 
argument from a different dimension, we can also argue that the effectiveness 
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and importance of macroeconomic policies coordination increases in the time of 
financial instability.
On the aspect of initiation of inflation targeting (2.5% RPI) in October 1992, we 
have also provided the empirical support to assertion by Libich et al. (2011) which 
suggested that the monetary policy should be made more explicit (inflation tar-
geting) and show commitment towards price stability. Their argument was that 
this mechanism would work as a partial substitute of monetary independence 
and coordination from the fiscal authority. Although their arguments were on 
price stability and requires empirical validations, yet our empirical analysis here 
shows that these are quite valid in the case of financial sector. It could be wit-
nessed that in the Post ERM period when the explicit inflation target was started 
that resulted in an increase in the influence of monetary policy (Table 6), though 
the Bank of England was not independent till May 1997. 
The inter-relationship between monetary and fiscal policies also increased in the 
period before withdrawal from ERM. It implies that the policies also affect each 
other more in the time of financial volatility; we must acknowledge the study by 
Franta et al. (2011) who argued that legislative and explicit inflation target could 
help monetary policy to control excessive fiscal spending and also lead to fiscal 
discipline. Contextualizing it in our findings, we could suggest that the inflation 
targeting may increase the association between policies hence their coordination 
becomes rather vital and more desirable for any positive role in financial markets. 
4.2 Independence of the Bank of England & Formulation of MPC 
After analysing the impact of the ERM and the start of inflation targeting we 
moved towards our second major institutional change i.e. independence of the 
Bank of England. On 6th May 1997 the BoE was delegated the authority to set up 
the interest rates, the Act was however approved and signed by the HM Queen 
in April 1998 to be enforced form the 1st of June 1998. As cited earlier with the 
independence of instrument (interest rates) setting, certain responsibilities for 
instance supervision of banking sector were also transferred to FSA. To find the 
impact of these institutional changes and whether they lead to structural break 
we performed Chow test by considering sample period from October 1993 to Au-
gust 20088. The null hypothesis of no structural break has been rejected against 
alternative of structural break at 95% confidence benchmark in the case of bond 
8 To conserve the space the results of structural break, lag selection and co-integration tests are 
not presented here and are available on request. 
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and at 99% benchmark, as in the case of stock markets. It implied that the asso-
ciation between our response and explanatory variables has been changed along 
with independence of the BoE, formulation of its Monetary Policy Committee 
and transfer of responsibilities to the FSA (Banking Sector Supervision) and the 
DMO (Sovereign Debt Management). 
To precisely reflect and document the shift in the association among under analy-
sis variables we estimated the aforementioned Vector Auto regression model for 
post MPC periods i.e. July 1998 to August 2008. However, as the first step we 
performed the optimal lag selection test where all the lag selection criterions 
unanimously suggested 23 as optimal numbers of lags, which is intuitive as the 
macroeconomic policies impact the financial markets through various channels 
some of which appear after a while. Therefore, following the unanimous advice by 
our lag selection criterions same numbers of lags were included. However, we also 
perform a Lag Exclusion test to cut off the number of lags by excluding the insig-
nificant lags. Thereafter, the co-integration test using Johansen method is carried 
out to check the presence of co-integrating relationship and to decide whether to 
use restricted VECM or un-restricted VAR framework. In the Johansen Co-in-
tegration test, both of our Unrestricted Co-integration Rank tests (Trace & Max 
Eigen statistics) showed that the null of no co-integration was rejected at 5% level 
on the basis of MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values, there are at least three 
co-integrating equations found. It implied that there are at least three time series 
that are co-integrated or have long term association as they share a common sto-
chastic drift. Hence we employed a restricted or the VEC Model by incorporating 
error correction terms (rank 3). The estimation of the model (Equations 1 & 2) for 
the Post independence of the BoE and formulation of MPC period also included 
a Dummy variable i.e. CRASH to control the effects of Dot Com Bubble which 
coincided with the 9/11 Attacks. The Dummy variable is a binary variable (0, 1), 
the study by Cameron (2005) considered it tremendously useful extension in the 
model. In our case we assigned a value to 0 to this variable from September 2001 
till December 2003 which indicates the period of Dot Com bubble burst and stock 
volatility in this period and in rest we assigned value of 1 (Cameron, 2005). For 
the observation with value of 0, the coefficients will have no role in influencing 
dependent variable whereas in the case of value of 1 the coefficients influence to 
alter the intercept. The results of estimation for Equation (1) and Post BoE inde-
pendence various values of coefficient size, sign and significance; however, the 
Error Correction terms showed significant and negative values. We included 3 
co-integration ranks as they gave maximum value of adjustment. It is an indica-
tion towards the stability of our model. The dummy variable CRASH showed a 
negative and significant coefficient value which implied that the period of Dot 
Com Bubble has negative effects on bond market. Thereafter we estimated the 
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second equation – Equation (2) for the same period. The model estimated showed 
some values below 5% significance level (p >0.05). However, considering the fact 
that we have a system of equation where variables are treated endogenously, it is 
vital to see the model on the whole. The dummy variable CRASH showed a posi-
tive, although not highly significant value of coefficient, which implied that the 
period of Dot Com bubble would have negative impact on the stock market as the 
period other than that for which we gave value of 1 to our binary dummy variable 
CRASH showed a positive sign. As mentioned earlier to decrease the number of 
insignificant lags we performed the Lag exclusion test. The results of the Wald 
Lag exclusion test showed that none of the lag was insignificant below the 5% 
level, hence we cannot drop and lag on the basis of its insignificance. Therefore, 
we accept the same numbers of lags suggested by lag selection test. Perhaps it is 
intuitive as it yields better estimates by following lag selection criteria. Hereafter, 
a diagnostic test is performed to check the robustness and validity of estimates 
and the results are presented in Table 7: 
Table 7: Diagnostic Test (Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation & Exogeneity)
Post Formulation of MPC & Independence of BoE Sep 1998 – Aug 2008
 Bond Market 
Heteroskedasticity : White Test Test Stat   P value
Obs. R-Squared 94.108  Prob. Chi-Square(92) 0.425
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test    
Obs. R-squared 45.624  Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.000*
Block Exogenity Wald test    
Fiscal 93.545 df-22 0.000*
Monetary 78.598 df-22 0.000*
All 165.928 df-66 0.000*
 Stock Market 
Heteroskedasticity : White Test Test Stat   P value
Obs. R-Squared 87.888  Prob. Chi-Square(92) 0.601
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test    
Obs. R-squared 35.636  Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.000*
Block Exogenity Wald test    
Fiscal 258.871 df-22 0.000*
Monetary 248.353 df-22 0.000*
All 707.728 df-66 0.000*
* Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level 
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The results of diagnostic test for the Post MPC formulation and the independence 
of the BoE period showed that for bond market the null hypothesis of No Serial 
Co-relation (Breusch Godfrey test) could not be accepted at the benchmarked 
level of statistical significance (5%). However, the null hypothesis of Homoske-
dasticity (White test) could not be rejected at benchmarked level of significance. 
Therefore, we do not have the issue of Heteroskedasticity in our model so we can 
rely on our results to be unbiased and consistent. Nevertheless, the Exogeneity 
test showed very interesting findings. With comparison to the pre-independence 
of the BoE scenarios in Table 6 the significance of exogenous impact of fiscal pol-
icy for bond market and monetary policy for stock market increased enormously. 
It implied that the independence of the BoE which included the changes in its 
structure and responsibilities increased the effectiveness of monetary authority 
on sovereign debt market and equity market. We would further discuss this phe-
nomenon in the Wald test in the next section. Nevertheless, in the context of 
macroeconomic policy combination, between monetary and fiscal policies the 
former showed a greater exogenous impact on stock while later showed a greater 
exogenous impact on bond market. However, both policies showed significant 
exogenous impact, whereas in the case of macroeconomic policy combination, it 
showed a rather greater exogenous impact than on both stock and bond markets. 
It implied that the solo effort of a single policy may influence one market more; 
however the combination of two could bring fruitful results for both markets. 
Thereafter we performed a Wald coefficient restriction test to evaluate the indi-
vidual and joint impact of macroeconomic policies on financial sector; the results 
are reported in Table 8. 
Table 8: Wald Test Vector Auto regression Model Sep 1998 – Aug 2008
Test Statistic Value df  (P-value)
LnBond 70.384 22 0.000*
Fiscal Policy 93.545 22 0.000*
Monetary Policy 78.598 22 0.000*
Fiscal + Monetary (coordination) 139.436 44 0.000*
Test Statistic Value df (P-value)
LnStock 234.606 22 0.000*
Fiscal Policy 258.871 22 0.000*
Monetary Policy 248.353 22 0.000*
Fiscal + Monetary (coordination) 476.296 44 0.000*
* Significance level (1%) ** Significance level (5%)
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As we can see in the post Bank of England’s independence there is a significant 
shift in association between macroeconomic policies and financial sector. While 
making a comparison between the Pre-MPC and the BoE independence period 
as presented in Table 7 with the Post BoE independence and formulation of the 
MPC period depicted in Table 8 it is evident that the individual impact of mon-
etary policy as well as fiscal policy increased to a large degree in its significance. 
The reason could be the transfer of sovereign debt supervision to Debt Manage-
ment Office for the bond market. Moreover the impact of fiscal policy and mac-
roeconomic policy combination on the bond market has been rather more sig-
nificant and greater during the latter period. It implies that the independence of 
the Bank of England and the formulation of MPC have increased the influence of 
policy interaction on the bond market although monetary policy at its own did 
have significant impact. This finding further validated the importance of macro-
economic policy coordination. 
Furthermore, the stock market also showed a shift in its response to macroeco-
nomic policy shocks. The impact of monetary policy remained highly significant. 
Moreover the fiscal policy also showed a significant long-run association with 
stock market. Concomitantly, this change towards rather more significant impact 
on stock market could be associated with the increase in effectiveness of macro-
economic policies after these institutional changes. It implies that although the 
market participants may anticipate fiscal and monetary authorities’ actions in the 
light of rationale expectations and market efficiency arguments, macroeconomic 
policies still have impact on financial market. Being very specific to this scenario 
as with the independence of the Bank of England instrument (interest setting) 
setting from fiscal authority (HM Treasury) control, the fiscal policy remained 
significant for stock market. It is very much in line with intuition and institu-
tional change. However, the joint impact of macroeconomic policy was also sig-
nificant which authenticated the notion of policy coordination. In summary, on 
the basis of these findings we can argue that the independence of the BoE and the 
formulation of MPC have important and positive implications for influence of 
macroeconomic policies on financial sector. It also led to the increased necessity 
of macroeconomic policy combination, particularly for its capacity to influence 
bond market and stock markets, though the monetary and fiscal policies also af-
fect bond and stock markets respectively. 
Finally to view a snap shot of the post MPC formulation and independence of 
the BoE, we performed an Impulse Response Function (IRF) Analysis for subject 
sub-periods and a comparison with the period before this institutional change 
was also made. The bootstrapping was performed to construct the confidence in-
terval by employing Efron Percentile Confidence Interval method. The one hun-
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dred bootstrap replications were carried out (B = 100). The results are presented 
in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: VECM Impulse Response Function (IRF): Period Sep 1998 – Aug 2008
Source: Authors calculations using JMulti-4.*Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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As we can see in Figure 4, the bond yield showed a positive response to expan-
sionary fiscal shocks implying a plunge in bond prices after fiscal expansion, 
however monetary contraction leads to a fall in real bond yield and a surge in the 
real price of bond which is not counter intuitive. As we are using the real yield on 
bonds a contractionary monetary policy effects show an increase in bond prices 
in real terms rather than nominal. It could be associated with the decrease in 
inflation due to the contractionary monetary stance. However, we will not go 
into details as it is beyond the scope of this study. Interestingly the interaction 
between policies showed that alternative shocks to monetary and fiscal policy did 
cause some volatility to each other implying interdependence even after the BoE 
independence. It is indeed a vital finding considering the fact that the MPC has 
representation of HM treasure on its board, although in non-voting observer sta-
tus. The stock market did show a persistent response to fiscal expansion whereas 
a positive (contractionary) monetary policy shock led to surge in stock prices af-
ter initial drop, implying that the monetary policy had short run impact on stock 
market in this period. 
In the context of optimal policy combination, the contractionary monetary 
policy showed a negative impact on the stock market whereas the bond market 
showed positive response. The contractionary fiscal policy also led to negative 
response from stock as well as bond markets. The fiscal contractions led to mon-
etary expansions and vice versa. Therefore, an appropriate policy combination in 
the light of these findings would be an expansionary fiscal stance while monetary 
policy could be passive considering the fact that it has heterogeneous response 
from the stock and bond markets, unless we are targeting a particular market in 
the short-run. It leads us to conclude. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The changes in institutional arrangement and the design of policy making au-
thorities appeared to be a major contribution factor in the dynamics of associa-
tion between policy coordination/combination and financial sector. In the Post-
ERM scenario, the impact of macroeconomic policies and their interaction on 
the financial sector shifted. Moreover, it was also found that the bond markets be-
came rather stable in Post-ERM period while the effectiveness of macroeconomic 
policies had also been increased for the stock market. On the basis of these find-
ings, we conclude that the withdrawal from the ERM was a vital factor for macro-
economic policy combination and its association with financial markets as post 
ERM effectiveness of macroeconomic policy combination has been increased for 
stock markets and the bond market has become more stable, hence the decision 
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to withdraw from ERM is appreciable in this context. The most important lesson 
to learn from it was that joining currency union in any form could reduce the 
capability of local policy makers to influence domestic financial sector. Moreover, 
the markets also showed instability in the form of massive fluctuations. With the 
benefit of hindsight we can see that this is the case in the European Monetary 
Union. However, the subject study has brought this aspect into the limelight in 
the context of British macroeconomic policy framework and the financial sector. 
The major and perhaps the most important institutional design change was the 
BoE independence which involved the formulation of the MPC and the alloca-
tion of some of the BoE’s responsibilities to the DMO. It is observed that the 
individual impact of macroeconomic policies as well as the impact of policy com-
bination significantly increased after the formulation of the MPC. It could be 
declared as the success of the strategy of giving the BoE autonomy with regards 
to the increased effectiveness of policies for financial sector. In the light of this 
institutional change, another conclusion we could draw was that the interaction 
between policies showed that alternative shocks to monetary and fiscal policy did 
cause considerable volatility to each other implying that although the BoE gained 
independence along with the earlier cited transfers of responsibilities, yet the pol-
icy of coordination remained important for financial stability. Considering the 
fact that we found a heterogeneous response from the stock and bond markets 
to monetary and fiscal stance, unless we are targeting a particular market in the 
short-run, moreover, alternative shocks to monetary and fiscal policy did cause 
considerable volatility to each other. Concomitantly, we can recommend that the 
institutional autonomy in the form of instrument independence (monetary pol-
icy decisions) could bring financial stability; however, there is a strong necessity 
for coordination even in Post-MPC and the BoE independence. 
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